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B engages an independent contractor, C.  C negligently injures A.  Can A sue B for the harm 
caused by the contractor (assuming that B is himself blameless)?  When A has a contract with B he 
will normally be able to recover (depending ultimately on the terms of the contract).  But not 
in tort.  Only if B’s duty is (exceptionally) “non-delegable” must he answer for C’s negligence 
(outside torts of strict liability, such as Rylands v Fletcher).  This article explains the doctrinal 
cogency of that elementary distinction between contract and tort.  It warns against drawing 
simple analogies between them (especially to justify liability in tort by considering B’s liability 
had a hypothetical contract existed between A and B).  This aspect of the recent decision in 
Woodland v Swimming Teachers Association is criticised accordingly.1  Drawing analogies might 
appear to be a simple common sense matter, and indeed the foundation of the common law 
technique.  But it is in fact no value-neutral exercise, whether in private law or high 
constitutional matters.2  Moreover, doctrinal reasoning can take us only so far.  There are 
bigger questions lurking here.  In the space of this article (with its primary focus on the 
doctrinal differences between contract and tort) we can only identify those bigger questions, 
and not provide final answers to them.  The immanent controversy arises from the increasingly 
common use of independent contractors (“outsourcing”) in the modern economy.  This social 
phenomenon raises questions about the traditional limitation of vicarious liability to the 
employment relationship.  To date there has been little appetite for questioning the axiom that 
there is no vicarious liability for independent contractors.  It should now be openly debated.  
This article clears the ground for that consideration to proceed. 
 
I. WOODLAND V SWIMMING TEACHERS ASSOCIATION 
 
Miss Woodland was injured during a swimming lesson organised as part of the curriculum at 
her state primary school—allegedly due to negligent supervision by the lifeguard on duty at a 
pool belonging to a local authority (Basildon Council) other than the one responsible for the 
claimant’s school (Essex County Council).  Basildon had outsourced provision of lessons and 
lifeguard services to an independent contractor (Direct Swimming Services).  Miss Woodland 
claimed against the lifeguard, the contractor, their common insurer (the first named 
defendant), and against both local authorities.  On the bare facts, any claim against the 
authorities was destined to fail unless they owed the claimant a “non-delegable duty” rendering 
them liable for the contractor’s negligence.  Differing from the courts below, the Supreme 
Court identified such a “non-delegable duty” and declined to strike the claims out. 
 Lord Sumption identified the claim as one falling under a second general heading of 
“non-delegable duties” in English law (i.e. not the much-criticised category of “inherently 
hazardous operations”). Namely where, pursuant to an “antecedent relationship” between the 
parties,  
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comments on earlier versions of this paper.  Naturally, they cannot be taken to approve the arguments 
that follow. 
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2 Cf. R. Dworkin, Justice in Robes (Cambridge, Mass. 2006), 69: “Is abortion more like infanticide or 
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the defendant is assuming a liability analogous to that assumed by a person who 
contracts to do work carefully. … The analogy with public services is often close, 
especially in the domain of hospital treatment in the National Health Service or 
education at a local education authority school, where only the absence of 
consideration distinguishes them from the private hospital or the fee-paying school 
performing the same functions under contract.3 
 
Lord Sumption further reasoned that as fee-paying schools’ responsibilities “are already non-
delegable because they are contractual”, there was “in this particular context … no rational 
reason why the mere absence of consideration should lead to an entirely different result when 
comparable services are provided by a public authority”.4  His Lordship similarly criticised “the 
technical distinctions that would otherwise arise between privately funded and NHS hospital 
treatment”.5 
 Most would feel instinctive sympathy with an innocent child’s severe injuries.  That 
makes the result in Woodland hard to criticise.  But the reasoning is not unproblematic.  It is 
questionable whether the local authorities had really “voluntarily assumed responsibility” for the 
way that the contractors taught the claimant to swim, let alone for the contractors’ solvency.  
Moreover, the advantageous position of claimants suing private schools and hospitals in contract 
does not of itself justify the extension of public service providers’ liability in tort.  People can 
always in principle bargain for greater rights (including protection against injury) through a 
contract.  Potential contractual liability can hardly then be a guide for the limits of tort (it 
would essentially abolish any limits).  The proper relationship between contract and tort is 
controversial, and historically fluid.  Stated very crudely, the prevailing view today is that tort 
should set the baseline of safety that everyone is entitled to expect, irrespective of payment.  
People are free to use their wealth to purchase additional services (including higher standards of 
care) if they like.  But if consumers have to pay to get reasonable care—if payment is not 
merely for luxuries (“optional extras”)—we face the “uncomfortable” feeling that the tort 
baseline falls unacceptably short.6  Criticism of the (over-)advantageous position of contracting 
parties in fact expresses dissatisfaction with the inadequacy of tort.  Tort would then need to 
reassess its own contours of liability, without the argument (which always proves too much) 
that paying consumers might have more extensive rights of action under contract.  Liability for 
breach of contact is usually strict—is that unfair on tort claimants who are usually required to 
prove fault? 
 
II. CONTRACT AND TORT 
 
There are many situations where liability is quite unproblematic in contract (e.g. for omissions, 
for pure economic loss) while controversial in tort.  Many have argued for the expansion of tort 
liability in these areas, for various reasons.  But few before Woodland passed from the trite 
observation that, had a contract existed between the parties, the defendant would have been 
liable to assert that therefore there must be liability in tort.  Such reasoning seems dubious.  
Within the outer limits of public policy (e.g. illegality), there are few obligations that cannot be 
deliberately created by a suitably drafted contract.  If tort liability always tracked the potential 
liabilities that parties could have created by contracting (although they actually did not contract), 
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5 Ibid. 
6 P.S. Atiyah, “Medical malpractice and the contract/tort boundary” (1986) 49 Law & Contemporary 
Problems 287, 297. 
it would know virtually no bounds.  This limitless expansion of tort would make much 
contracting redundant.  Why contract for (and pay for) an obligation that the law of torts 
anyway imposes on the prospective promisor?7 
 That last statement might be thought to prove too much.  Is it not always the case that 
tort liability gives claimants “free” what they would otherwise had to have paid (contracted) for?  
Blanket disapproval of such “free-riding” leads directly back to the 19th Century world of very 
limited tort liability.  Far from the post-Donoghue v Stevenson presupposition that we are all 
entitled to expect reasonable care from our neighbour, “in the period of classical contract law 
[c. 1770-1870], a right to due care was still largely seen as something for which [people] had to 
pay”.8  
 
“In classical law it was clear that the promise principle was not merely an affirmative 
principle of liability, but also an exclusionary principle of no liability. In general, if you 
promised, you were liable, but if you did not promise, then conversely you were not 
liable… Nor was this exclusionary function of promising purely the result of formalism 
or of limited vision. It reflected an ideological commitment to the respect for 
individual autonomy…”9   
 
Winterbottom v Wright was not flawed by a logical fallacy that “escaped the perspicuity of judges 
like Abinger C.B.” only to be “brilliantly exposed” in Donogue v Stevenson.10  That familiar fable 
(“what passes for legal reasoning in students’ textbooks”) is “almost complete nonsense”; the 
court in Winterbottom relied on policy, not (fallacious) doctrinal “logic”.11  Only the customer 
who paid for the goods should be entitled to sue the manufacturer in respect of defects, they 
reasoned.  It looks one-sided today: what about the competing policy of consumer protection 
for injured bystanders?  But Donoghue v Stevenson represents a policy choice—ultimately an 
“ideological commitment”—as much as the Court of Exchequer’s in Winterbottom v Wright.  The 
shift from contract to tort was “essentially designed to be redistributive”.12 
 Atiyah hailed the “Fall of Freedom of Contract” in the mid-20th Century (prematurely, 
as he came to admit). But tort liability has certainly expanded. The universal duty to exercise 
due care was couched in moral (indeed Biblical) terms by Lord Atkin in Donoghue v Stevenson.  
More prosaically, for Lord Reid “life would be impossible in modern conditions unless on the 
highway and in the market place we were entitled to rely on the other man behaving like a 
reasonable man”.13  These are general duties arising between strangers, between everyone.  
Lawyers today take this for granted, yet the contrast with the “heyday of classical contract 
theory, when nearly all liabilities were thought to depend on some element of free choice, or 
consent”, is striking.14 
                                                        
7 Precisely Tony Weir’s criticism of Hedley Byrne v Heller [1964] A.C. 465: “Liability for syntax” [1963] 
C.L.J. 216, 218 (“One can hope, perhaps, that in most cases it will continue to be ‘reasonable’ to rely 
only on a word one has bought”).  See further D. Campbell, “The curious incident of the dog that did 
bark in the night-time: What mischief does Hedley Byrne […] correct?” in K. Barker, R. Grantham and 
W. Swain (eds.), The Many Faces of Misstatement Liability: 50 Years On From Hedley Byrne v Heller (Oxford 
2015, forthcoming). 
8 P.S. Atiyah, The Rise and Fall of Freedom of Contract (Oxford 1979) (Rise and Fall) 501. 
9 P.S. Atiyah, Book review (1981) 95 Harvard L.R. 509, 520-521 (emphasis in original). 
10 Atiyah, Rise and Fall 502; (1842) 10 M. & W. 109, [1932] A.C. 562. 
11 Atiyah ibid. 
12 Atiyah, “Medical malpractice” n. 000 above, 289 n.13 (emphasis in original). 
13 Gollins v Gollins [1964] A.C. 644, 664. 
14 Atiyah, Rise and Fall 501 
Far from the absence of contract excluding tort liability (through “respect for individual 
autonomy”), Markesinis argued (addressing unreformed privity of contract) that English law has 
“An expanding tort law—[as] the price of a rigid contract law”.15 Atiyah also welcomed 
recourse to tort where the absence of contractual liability arises from “arbitrary and perhaps 
technical restrictions”.16   The high water mark in pure economic loss liability came in 1982 
with Junior Books v Veichi.17  But within a decade the courts had accepted that recognising tort 
duties of care within large construction/engineering projects risked subverting the contractual 
structure.18  Even Atiyah agreed that cases involving “a deliberate refusal to accept responsibility 
in contract” should be treated differently.19  Subcontractors’ and suppliers’ roles are 
deliberately separated from main contractors’.  “There simply is no point in this elaborate set of 
commercial arrangements if the various parties are all liable for negligence in tort anyhow”.20  
To avoid “free-riding”, tort “should not duplicate opportunities of protection of the plaintiff and 
deterrence of the defendant which were already available to the plaintiff but which the plaintiff 
failed to take”.21  Atiyah nevertheless observed that to accept this critique of Junior Books one 
must “follow the ideology of the New Right” with its “great revival of belief in Freedom of 
Contract”.22  Fleming, too, argued that denying actions to those deemed capable of protecting 
themselves through contract reflected “the primacy of private ordering, expressing the ideology 
of the free-marketers of the 80s”.23  Such arguments receive corroboration from the opposition 
of Judge Richard Posner to economic loss liability in tort.  Posner J. prefers to describe it as 
“commercial loss” to make the point that: 
 
tort law is a superfluous and inapt tool for resolving purely commercial disputes. We 
have a body of law designed for such disputes. It is called contract law.24 
 
 Thus, whether to impose tort liability  in the absence of a contract is no dry, 
technical question.  Even to (“merely”) fill “gaps” assumes what “full” protection requires.  If the 
parties could have contracted for the obligation, does tort liability not (at best) give the 
claimant something for nothing or (at worst) upset the parties’ intentional exclusion of liability 
inter se?  Such reasoning has now been accepted in some pure economic loss cases.25  It does 
assume the primacy of contractual arrangements, as Fleming and Atiyah point out.26  Arguably 
                                                        
15 (1987) 103 L.Q.R. 354. 
16 P.S. Atiyah, “Freedom of Contract and the New Right” in Essays on Contract (Oxford 1988) (Essays), 
380. 
17 [1983] 1 A.C. 520. 
18 Simaan General Contracting Co v Pilkington Glass [1988] Q.B. 758. 
19 Essays 382 (emphasis in original) 
20 Atiyah ibid.  Cf. p. 000 below. 
21 J. Stapleton, “Duty of care: peripheral parties and alternative opportunities for deterrence” (1995) 
111 L.Q.R. 301, 302.  Similarly, Campbell n.000 above. 
22 Essays 382, 385 
23 J.G. Fleming, “Tort in a Contractual Matrix” (1993) 5 Canterbury L.R. 269 at 277 (quoted by 
Stapleton n 000 above at 345, denying that her argument “accords primacy to the contractual 
paradigm”). 
24 Miller v US Steel Corpn. 902 F.2d 573 (1990).  Cited in Perre v Apand Pty Ltd (1999) 164 A.L.R. 606, 
[121]-[122] per McHugh J. (“This passage contains an important truth”). 
25 Campbell n.000 demands abolition of the “Hedley Byrne principle” itself (especially deploring Henderson 
v Merrett Syndicates Ltd [1995] 2 A.C. 145). 
26 Campbell ibid accepts this, setting out his personal political belief in market ordering to underline the 
point (and tracing the contrasting intellectual climate for Hedley Byrne back to the contemporary triumph 
of “political authority … as the final arbiter of economic life”: C.A.R. Crosland, The Future of Socialism 
(London 1956), 73). 
today’s “intellectual climate”, like that of the early nineteenth century, subscribes to: “Free 
choice in all things, rational planning, calculated risk assessment, and the severest limitation of 
the active role of state and judge”.27  But since Donoghue v Stevenson a very different approach has 
been taken to physical injury claims.  Here it remains the case, conversely, that “the law of tort 
is the general law, out of which the parties can, if they wish, contract”.28 
The primacy of contract in the public sphere today, following the “outsourcing” or 
“contracting-out” of service provision, occasioned the claimant’s legal difficulties in Woodland.  
Before that great policy shift of the 1980s (which remains politically controversial),29 the fateful 
swimming lesson would have taken place in a pool staffed by council-employed lifeguards for 
whose negligence the council would have been vicariously liable.30  The Supreme Court used 
that historical point to support liability for contractors; outsourcing should not worsen the legal 
position of injured members of the public (compared to the era when services were provided 
directly by council employees).31  This too, of course, is an ideological position.32  Previously 
the House of Lords accepted that outsourced care-home provision by a private company meant 
that the Human Rights Act 1998 did not apply (whereas the Act would, uncontroversially, have 
applied to a council-operated home).  Lord Neuberger noted that part of the rationale for 
outsourcing “may be to avoid some of the legal constraints and disadvantages which apply to 
local authorities but not to private operators”; it was not for the court to rule on the validity of 
that policy, “unattractive though it may be to some people”.33  Such abstentionism is no doubt a 
policy choice also.  But at least Lord Neuberger acknowledged the sensitive dilemma.  In 
Woodland the Supreme Court simply assumed that outsourcing should not worsen the claimant’s 
position.  That position is not indefensible, of course.  It would be a stretch of the imagination 
to attribute to Parliament a positive intention of making injured public service users worse off 
by contracting-out.  On the other hand, the economic structure of outsourcing, especially the 
insurance arrangements adopted, arguably do require authorities to be insulated from their 
contractors’ negligence.34  But these arguments were simply not considered by the Supreme 
Court.35 
Contrary to the Supreme Court’s expansionary approach, it is widely accepted that 
outside directly inflicted physical injury cases, certain obligations are owed only when paid 
for—i.e. in contract, but not in tort.  Sometimes this is implicit, sometimes openly 
acknowledged,36 and sometimes even the justification for the absence of liability in tort. 
Emergency services generally owe no common law duty of care to reply to call-outs.37  
The absence of liability for omissions applies even when the police are made aware of credible 
threats of severe personal injury, but fail to act.38  Yet nobody doubts that a contractual claim 
would lie in parallel circumstances.  When a plutocrat employs a bodyguard there can be no 
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29 P. Butler, “Thatcher’s outsourcing fantasy fails in reality” The Guardian 16 October 2012. 
30 Recognised in Woodland by Lord Sumption at [25] (4) and Baroness Hale at [40]. 
31 But compare the absence of “non-delegable duty” when British military hospitals were closed and 
medical services transferred to local German hospitals: A (A Child) v Ministry of Defence [2004] EWCA Civ 
641; [2005] Q.B. 183. 
32 Consider YL v Birmingham City Council [2007] UKHL 27; [2008] A.C. 95; S. Palmer, “Public, private 
and the Human Rights Act 1998: An ideological divide” [2007] C.L.J. 559. 
33 YL ibid [152]. 
34 R. Merkin and J. Steele, Insurance and the Law of Obligations (Oxford 2013), 236, 245-247. 
35 Cf. [2012] EWCA Civ 239 [34], [38], per Tomlinson L.J. 
36 Robinson v PE Jones (Contractors) Ltd. [2011] EWCA Civ 9; [2012] Q.B. 44, [76], [79] per Jackson L.J. 
37 Capital & Counties plc v Hampshire County Council [1997] Q.B. 1004 (fire brigade).  Cf. Kent v Griffiths 
[2001] Q.B. 36 (ambulance). 
38 Van Colle v Chief Constable of Hertfordshire [2008] UKHL 50; [2009] 1 A.C. 225. 
doubt that the guard’s contractual duties include responding to credible threats of violence 
against his employer.  Or the resident of an exclusive gated community would be able to sue 
the firm employed to provide security services for negligently failing to apprehend burglars in 
her property; a claim denied to οἱ πολλοί suing the police in tort.39  It would be ridiculous to 
posit contractual immunity here for failing to provide the service paid for, purely because 
public authorities are not liable in tort to the public at large for similar failings.40  Conversely, 
while the absence of emergency service liability has certainly been criticized,41 the objection is 
not that those who pay for similar services privately would have an action in contract and that 
the public (suing in tort) should not be worse off.  The police themselves might be employed to 
provide “special services” for payment,42 and thus (presumably) owe more extensive duties in 
contract than to the public at large.  Tort sets its baseline independently from potentially wider 
rights in contract (for which people can, if they will, pay). 
 Courts have regularly dismissed tort claims while expressly acknowledging that a 
similar claim in contract might have succeeded.  An example is “loss of a chance”, which has not 
been permitted to form the basis of claim in negligence.43  In one leading case Lord Scott 
suggested that claimants relying instead on contracts of employment might have been able to 
recover such losses.44  Assuming this suggestion well founded,45 the different result would 
follows from another doctrinal axiom: that while damage is the gist of the action in negligence 
(and so its existence must be proved on the balance of probabilities), a breach of contract is 
actionable per se (and consequential loss is quantified on a “chance” basis).  This explains other 
divergences, including that over “preventive damages”.46 
Not all judges have approved such differential outcomes.  In Hotson, Donaldson M.R. 
advocated loss-of-chance claims in tort, observing that if they were denied, National Health 
Service patients would be worse off than private patients relying on contracts in otherwise 
“identical circumstances”. The Master of the Rolls was “quite unable to detect any rational basis 
for [such] a state of the law”.47   But the House of Lords was, and has remained, unmoved.  That 
paying patients can recover lost chance damages has not entailed recognition of that head of loss 
in negligence.48 
 McFarlane v Tayside Health Board settled the “wrongful birth” debate: the pursuers could 
not recover the cost of bringing up a child conceived after an allegedly negligent vasectomy.  
                                                        
39 Alexandrou v Oxford [1993] 4 All E.R. 328. 
40 Compare C. McKay, “Concurrent liability in claims for loss of chance of a better medical outcome” 
(2012) 20 Torts L.J. 29 (arguing that if one cannot recover such damages in tort, the same should be 
true in contract. An exception is allowed for “express contractual guarantee[s] … demonstrated through 
explicit and unequivocal representations”, but would the protective obligation not be implicit, in the 
examples given in the text?). 
41 e.g. S. Tofaris and S. Steel, “Police Liability in Negligence for Failure to Prevent Crime: Time to 
Rethink” University of Cambridge Faculty of Law Research Paper No. 39/2014 (via SSRN). 
42 Police Act 1996, s.25(1). 
43 Gregg v Scott [2005] UKHL 2; [2005] 2 A.C. 176, Rothwell v Chemical & Insulating Co [2007] UKHL 39; 
[2008] 1 A.C. 281, Hotson v East Berkshire A.H.A. [1987] A.C. 750. 
44 Rothwell ibid [74] (cf. A. Burrows, “Uncertainty about uncertainty: damages for loss of a chance” 
[2008] J.P.I.L. 31, 42). 
45 For criticism cf. McKay n.000 above. 
46 J.G. Fleming, “Preventive Damages” in N.J. Mullany (ed.), Torts in the Nineties (Sydney 1997); D. 
Nolan, “Preventive Damages” (S.L.S. Conference paper, 2014). 
47 n.000 above p.760 (Court of Appeal).  See similarly Gregg v Scott [2002] EWCA Civ 1471, [65] per 
Mance L.J. 
48 Cf. McKay n.000 above (absence of liability in tort should entail the same in contract). 
The McFarlanes’ action, against an NHS authority, was necessarily delictual.49  But it was 
accepted that the position of a private patient suing in contract could well be different.  Lord 
Slynn of Hadley stated: “If a client wants to be able to recover such costs he or she must do so 
by an appropriate contract”.50  This accepts (as it must) that people can, if they wish (and can 
find a willing doctor) bargain for protection against the costs of childcare should the operation 
fail.  Freedom of contract.  But that can scarcely require the same rights of action in tort to 
those who have not contracted for it.  On the contrary, as Lord Slynn implies, tort protects 
certain basic rights (especially personal rather than economic interests) that people can pay to 
enhance by contracting for higher protection, if they are able. 
 It is hard to see how this could be otherwise.  The law allows people wide freedom to 
contract for services, on whatever terms they choose, including the rights of action should 
things go wrong.  Tort law would collapse if its internal structure were replaced by speculation 
about the liabilities that parties might have assumed by contract.  For this reason, pace Lord 
Sumption, “the mere absence of consideration” does, quite properly, “lead to an entirely 
different result”.51  It is true that this may also lead to indirect social discrimination.52  Those 
employing private bodyguards, or paying for private education, are necessarily persons of 
means.  Those reliant on equivalent public services (the police, state schooling) may not be 
wealthy.  To the extent that such contracts confer broader rights of action, the rich will be 
better protected against negligent harm.  But you get what you pay for.  The objection (if this is 
unfair) is not that the private consumer is protected too well, but that tort protects the public 
service recipient inadequately.   
The Supreme Court’s express disapproval of distinctions (in the present context) 
between state and private schooling or healthcare has undeniable egalitarian appeal.  Such 
sentiments may or may not show the judiciary in tune with general social attitudes—the 
position is by no means uncontroversial.53  But egalitarianism can hardly efface all doctrinal 
differences between contract and tort.  So long as tort provides a certain level of protection to 
everyone (irrespective of payment) according to its own established structure and doctrine, and 
so long as people are entitled to use their wealth to contract for higher levels of protection, 
such distinctions are unavoidable.  Liability for the fault of an independent contractor is one 
well-settled distinction.  It is not clear why courts should rush to blur it when in other areas 
(like loss of a chance), recipients of public services have been left worse off than private clients 
suing in contract.  If anything should be criticised it is not the contract-tort distinction, but the 
absence of liability for independent contractors in tort per se. 
 
III. DUTIES TO ENSURE THAT CARE IS TAKEN (AND THE “NON-DELEGABLE DUTY”) 
 
A contractual “duty of care” is usually interpreted as one to see that care is taken (by whoever 
actually provides the relevant service).  In tort, by contrast, a duty of care is normally just 
that—a duty that the defendant herself take reasonable care.  Exceptionally, however, a more 
stringent tortious duty is imposed, that the defendant ensure that care is taken (by whoever is 
actually carrying out the relevant activity).  This is known, very misleadingly, as a “non-
delegable duty”.  No duty of care can be delegated, but its performance may well be (whether 
to employees, independent contractors, or otherwise).  Sometimes the defendant would be 
                                                        
49 See for discussion: Dow v Tayside University Hospitals NHS Trust 2006 S.C.L.R. 865; Holdich v Lothian 
Health Board 2014 S.L.T. 495, [60]-[76]. 
50 [2000] 2 A.C. 59, 76.  Consider Thake v Maurice [1986] Q.B. 644. 
51 Woodland [25] (5). 
52 Cf. McKay n.000 above, 58: “undesirable and discriminatory social consequences” (but as seen, 
McKay also accepts that people may contract for more extensive rights of action). 
53 Compare Sir K. Joseph and J. Sumption, Equality (London 1979). 
negligent not to “delegate” an activity to a more suitable third party (for example where 
expertise is needed).54  It would be absurd to create a doctrine to prevent such delegation.  But 
the “non-delegable duty”, despite its name, does no such thing.  Engagement of independent 
contractors (and “delegation” of the relevant activity to them) remains perfectly permissible; 
however the defendant must exceptionaly ensure that they take reasonable care (or rather, since 
it is impossible to ensure that contractors are never careless, he must answer for any harm 
negligently caused). 
 It would be better to avoid the misnomer altogether.55  But the terminology is so well 
entrenched that it may be less confusing to continue calling “non-delegable duty” what is more 
accurately a duty to ensure that care is taken.  The reformulation is not just playing with words.  
Taking the ordinary duty to be careful first, it is always permissible (and sometimes—as seen—
even obligatory) to engage suitable persons to carry out an activity on one’s behalf.  The careful 
defendant must take reasonable steps to ensure that the persons engaged really are “suitable”, 
and may thereafter need to instruct, train and supervise them, depending on the circumstances.  
But the most reputable, best instructed and closely supervised worker or firm may still make 
mistakes.  Yet it is quite possible that one who employs a negligent worker has not been 
negligent himself.  When owing the standard duty of care, the defendant employer will not be 
liable in that case. 
 To that statement two qualifications must be made: vicarious liability and the “non-
delegable duty”.  The former is so important, and normal, that the qualification virtually 
swallows the rule.  A defendant is vicariously liable for torts committed by his employees within 
the course of their employment.  There are thus three ways to get judgment against the 
employer when a master-servant relationship exists.  First to show that the servant was a 
tortfeasor and the tort in the course of employment.  Secondly, to show “direct” negligence on 
the part of the employer, for example a failure to employ suitable staff or to train them 
properly; or thirdly (exceptionally) a “non-delegable duty”, i.e. to ensure that care was taken 
by the employee.  As Weir comments, all these situations are “inevitably triangular” but the 
“routes round the triangle really must be kept separate”.56  Most claimants will take the first 
route, vicarious liability, for obvious reasons: the claimant does not have to prove the 
employer’s fault (i.e. “direct” negligence),57 or the existence of an exceptional “non-delegable 
duty”.  But sometimes the simpler vicarious liability route is barred to the claimant.  A tort 
might occur outside the course of employment.  While that doctrine has been considerably 
expanded,58 cases will still arise where the servant-tortfeasor is on a “frolic of his own”. 
 The extension of the course of employment, and other expansionary currents within 
vicarious liability, will divert ever more claims along this route.  The paucity of claims resorting 
to “direct” negligence explains counsel’s remarkable “round assertion” in 1986 that “no health 
authority ever had been, or in principle ever could be, under any such direct liability”, with 
sufficient plausibility to raise doubts for Mustill L.J.59  It is now clear that a health authority may 
                                                        
54 e.g. Haseldine v Dawe [1941] 2 K.B. 343; Farraj v King’s Healthcare NHS Trust [2009] EWCA Civ 1203; 
[2010] 1 W.L.R. 2139, [103] per Sedley L.J. 
55 Cf. R. Stevens, “Non-delegable duties and vicarious liability” in J.W. Neyers et al. (eds.), Emerging 
Issues in Tort Law (Oxford 2007), 332 (“arguably a misnomer”). 
56 J.A. Weir, A Casebook on Tort, 10th ed. (London 2004), 292 (criticising Lister v Hesley Hall [2001] 
UKHL 22; [2002] 1 A.C. 215). 
57 Sometimes there may be no “direct” duty for reasons of public policy, but the defendant may 
nevertheless be vicariously liable for its employees’ negligence: Phelps v Hillingdon L.B.C. [2001] 2 A.C. 
619.  Weir ibid 270 comments: “Given that the authorities cannot perform their functions at all except 
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58 Lister n. 000 above. 
59 Wilsher v Essex Area Health Authority [1987] Q.B. 730, 748 (cf. Browne-Wilkinson V.-C. at 778). 
indeed be directly liable for failing to provide adequate treatment.60  Direct institutional duties 
of care are often pleaded in cases where vicarious liability seems dubious.61  Its success naturally 
requires proof that the employer was at fault.62 
 One case in which vicarious liability remains axiomatically unavailable, despite its 
recent expansion, is when the person employed to do the job was an independent contractor.  
To affix liability on the negligent contractor’s employer (more accurately, the contractor’s 
customer),63 the claimant must show breach by the customer/employer of his own duty to the 
claimant.  If that duty is the ordinary duty to be careful, the claim will fail unless the 
customer/employer was at fault in engaging the contractor.64 Of course many claims will 
founder on this requirement.  Exceptionally however, the claimant has a much more 
advantageous route to the customer/employer—the “non-delegable duty”.  Because this is 
(recall) a duty to ensure that care is taken, the customer/employer is in breach of it (irrespective 
of fault on his part) whenever the contractor is negligent.  It is a duty to ensure a certain result, 
not merely to take care: a form of strict liability.  This constitutes the “non-delegable duty’s” 
exceptional status: “it departs from the basic principles of liability in negligence by substituting 
for the duty to take reasonable care a more stringent duty, a duty to ensure that reasonable care 
is taken”.65 
Given this strict liability for the fault of another, the “non-delegable duty” bears more 
than a passing resemblance to vicarious liability.  It has accordingly been dismissed as a “logical 
fraud”66—nothing more than a sleight-of-hand to produce what is supposed to be impossible, 
namely vicarious liability for the torts of independent contractors.  Now from a strictly 
doctrinal point of view, this charge is baseless.  It stands to reason that the “non-delegable duty” 
must operate differently from vicarious liability, or it could not be applicable to independent 
contractors (to be less mealy-mouthed, it could not outflank the prohibition on vicarious 
liability unless it were something other than vicarious liability).  They are “two routes round the 
triangle”; in Baroness Hale’s words, “conceptually quite different”.67  The doctrinal apparatus 
certainly differs—the “course of employment” is not as such relevant in cases of independent 
contractors, although a not dissimilar exception for “casual or collateral negligence” has been 
recognised.68  Yet “non-delegable duties” are pled by tort claimants precisely because, and only 
because, there is no vicarious liability for independent contractors and the defendant may not 
have been careless personally.  Despite the conceptual differences, the outcome is usually 
identical to vicarious liability.  
This explains the appeal of “non-delegable duties” to claimants.  Increasingly, judges 
have candidly admitted that “non-delegable duties” are recognised precisely to fill some 
perceived gap in vicarious liability.  One such gap was the doctrine of “common employment”: 
an exception to vicarious liability when one servant was injured by another of the same 
master.69  Judicial attitudes towards workplace injuries claims had softened by the end of the 
19th Century, as shown by the narrowed defence of volenti non fit injuria.70  Yet it was beyond 
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the judges to remove the common employment defence.71  Instead, a “non-delegable duty” was 
created by the House of Lords in Wilsons & Clyde Coal Co v English:72 when one worker carelessly 
injured a fellow worker, the employer was put in breach of its own duty to ensure that care was 
taken (i.e. to provide a safe system of work).  Yet despite being the “leading example” of the 
“non-delegable duty” approach, “Lord Wright’s approach [in Wilsons] is vulnerable to the 
criticism that he advances no reason or policy consideration for fixing the employer with the 
higher duty to see that care is taken instead of the duty that he himself take reasonable care”.73  
Courts now accept what was once seen as a dangerously Realist answer: the policy in Wilsons 
was to fill the gap in vicarious liability created by common employment.74  
Similarly, in a period when there were real doubts over whether hospital surgeons 
could be classified as employees (given that close control was the traditional hallmark of 
“servant” status), Lord Greene M.R. and Denning L.J. suggested that hospitals owed a “non-
delegable duty” to ensure that all staff, irrespective of employment status, took reasonable 
care.75  As Baroness Hale stated in Woodland, this invocation of the “non-delegable duty”, too, 
was “to get round what was then perceived to be another problem with the law of vicarious 
liability”.76  Her Ladyship approved the circumvention, suggesting it as a “ready answer” to 
another lacuna that she identified in the context of modern hospitals (and schools)—injuries 
caused by the carelessness of an agency nurse or supply teacher.77   
Such judicial frankness is both welcome and rare.  But it does raise further questions.  
What are the criteria for recognising an exceptionally stringent tortious duty to ensure that care 
is taken, departing as it does from the basic obligation in negligence to take reasonable care?  If 
the sole criterion is to plug gaps in vicarious liability, this simply begs the question.  Stating that 
there is a “gap” to be filled assumes that vicarious liability is (in the relevant respect) too 
narrow, but that needs to be demonstrated.  And if vicarious liability is too narrow, it does 
little credit to leave that doctrine unreformed while producing a simulacrum of outcome via the 
“non-delegable duty”.  Should vicarious liability be flawed it demands reform, not a conceptual 
tap-dance to avoid the issue.  Beatson L.J. has recently observed that although for critics of 
vicarious liability “the concept of a non-delegable duty may appear to be a more attractive, 
direct and principled solution”, in fact (in Paula Gilliker’s words) resort to it “derives from 
frustration at the limits of vicarious liability rather than any considered conceptual 
development”.78  His Lordship therefore proceeded to address the boundaries of vicarious 
liability, as raised by the case.  Such direct engagement is most welcome.  Other recent cases 
have extended vicarious liability from its paradigm of the master-servant relationship.79  The 
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extension has not yet reached contractors.  If and when that nettle is grasped, what independent 
reason for the retention of “non-delegable duties” in tort could be cited? 
The strong suspicion remains that tort law exceptionally imposes strict liability to 
ensure that care is taken to reach functionally identical results to vicarious liability in situations 
where that doctrine is held inapplicable.  Admittedly, by conceptually distinct means.  But 
which route we take round the triangle has little importance beyond preserving the doctrinal 
decencies (or less charitably, allowing questions about vicarious liability to remain unasked).  In 
contract law there is little debate about which route to take.  Liability for others’ negligence 
poses no special difficulties when promisors are strictly liable for non-performance. 
 
IV. CONTRACTUAL LIABILITY FOR THE FAULT OF OTHERS 
 
The characteristic strictness of liability for breach of contract is not always sufficiently 
appreciated.80  Strikingly, even duties that appear at first sight to be duties “of care” are 
interpreted as duties to ensure that care is taken—a strict duty to achieve a particular result, not 
merely take reasonable steps to achieve it. 
Just as “why” a promisor failed to perform is generally “immaterial”,81 so is the question 
of “who” was responsible for the failure.  Lord Diplock explained in Photo Production v Securicor 
that promisors frequently, and often of necessity, engage others to perform what they have 
undertaken to do: 
 
My Lords, it is characteristic of commercial contracts, nearly all of which today are 
entered into not by natural legal persons, but by fictitious ones, i.e., companies, that 
the parties promise to one another that some thing will be done; for instance, that 
property and possession of goods will be transferred, that goods will be carried by ship 
from one port to another, that a building will be constructed in accordance with agreed 
plans, that services of a particular kind will be provided. … Where what is promised 
will be done involves the doing of a physical act, performance of the promise 
necessitates procuring a natural person to do it; but the legal relationship between the 
promisor and the natural person by whom the act is done, whether it is that of master 
and servant, or principal and agent, or of parties to an independent subcontract, is 
generally irrelevant. If that person fails to do it in the manner in which the promisor 
has promised to procure it to be done, as, for instance, with reasonable skill and care, 
the promisor has failed to fulfil his own primary obligation.82 
 
Cockburn C.J. similarly noted that promisees are usually “indifferent … whether 
[performance] is done by the immediate party to the contract, or by someone on his behalf”.83  
The promisee expects a service of the stipulated quality to be provided—not that the promisor 
personally performs it to that quality, or indeed personally does anything at all. 
 Here is the answer to Weir’s question, “Why do textbooks on Contract not have a 
chapter on vicarious liability?”84  A company selling goods CIF Rotterdam is not promising that 
it will deliver them there itself, let alone that it will personally take reasonable care to do it.  
Nor does the buyer expect these things.  The promise is construed in absolute terms: the seller 
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will ensure that the goods are delivered on the specified date and if they are not he will in 
breach of his own contractual undertaking, irrespective of whether he could have done 
otherwise.  Whether the default is attributable to the promisor personally (impossible when the 
promisor is not a natural person), or to his own employees, or to an independent contractor is 
immaterial.  Strict liability makes such questions of fault (and, a fortiori, whose fault) irrelevant. 
 Although not quite so obviously, contractual duties that appear to be framed in less-
than-absolute terms are equally stringent.  A duty to supply goods of satisfactory quality is not a 
duty to supply perfect goods guaranteed against any risk of failure.  The duty in a charterparty 
to supply a seaworthy ship does not require an unsinkable vessel.  Nevertheless, there is an 
absolute duty to achieve the relevant (qualified) standard: it is no defence for a seller to prove 
that he took all possible care to deliver satisfactory goods (if those delivered did not, in fact, 
reach that standard), or for the shipowner to plead that he did everything possible to make the 
ship seaworthy (if, in fact, it was not).   
Crucially for present purposes, even contractual duties to render services of a good, 
professional standard are construed as a duty to ensure that care is taken.85  For example, in 
construction contracts the builder’s usual obligation is to build in a “workmanlike manner”.86  
But this imports a guarantee that the work is done in a “workmanlike” way, whoever actually 
carries it out.  Builders commonly engage various subcontractors (in addition to their own 
workforce); even the largest firms contract-out specialist tasks like installing lifts.  Should any 
of the subcontractors (or their sub-subcontractors, etc) fail to do the work in a “workmanlike 
manner”, the main building contractor will be put in breach of its own duty to see that the 
project is satisfactorily carried out and completed.87  It is immaterial that a reputable 
subcontractor had been selected, instructed and monitored.   A duty to guarantee that care is 
taken by whoever does the work, although exceptional in tort, is a standard feature of 
construction contracts. 
Generations of common lawyers have reasoned that when someone pays for goods of a 
particular quality, or for a service of a certain standard, an absolute obligation presumptively 
arises to provide it—not merely an obligation to make reasonable efforts to provide it.  The 
customer is purchasing the stipulated goods or services, and it is a matter of complete 
indifference to him how the provider chooses to render them.  (For the reasons given by Lord 
Diplock, it is (to put it no higher) readily foreseeable that the provider will rely on various 
employees, agents and contractors to do so.)  Strict duties therefore meet commercial 
expectations.   
Strong evidence for that assertion is the widespread acceptance of the common law 
position in industry-adopted standards (which could, of course, replace the default strict 
liability with fault-based standards if these were commercially preferable).88  For example, 
major construction projects are usually governed by Joint Contracts Tribunal standard forms, 
drawn up by representatives of all the industry’s interest groups.  The JCT forms make no 
attempt to displace the builder’s strict duty to ensure that the project is completed in a 
“workmanlike manner” by a personal obligation to take reasonable care that could be discharged 
by employing competent subcontractors.  Understandably so.  Such a limited duty would be 
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much less valuable to the employer.  He would pay much less for it, if he would accept it at 
all—which he probably would not.   
Chains of contracts in the building industry (from employer, to main contractor, to 
subcontractor…) remain governed by privity of contract.  Even since the common law doctrine 
was relaxed by statute, nearly all JCT forms have been careful to exclude the possible operation 
of the Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999.  Each party answers in law only to his 
immediate employer, and not to other parties further up the chain (even though they too will 
foreseeably suffer loss from his shoddy work).  Such an arrangement assumes and necessitates 
the strict liability discussed above.  Imagine that a subcontractor, C, does unsatisfactory work 
despite being carefully engaged and supervised by the main contractor, B.  Given privity of 
contract, the building owner (i.e. B’s employer, A) will not be able to sue C in contract for the 
substandard work—and after a brief period of confusion this remains the position in tort also.89  
Were (blameless) B not liable to A for C’s substandard work either, then A would have no 
remedy against anyone—a commercial absurdity.  (Hence, no doubt, why leading works on 
construction law do not expressly discuss B’s contractual liability in this common situation: it 
truly goes without saying.)  But the result is not felt unduly harsh on B, who can pass liability 
on to the “ultimate culprit” using the “well known chain of third party procedures”.90 
This approach is not of course limited to building contracts.  A rare case in which the 
principles were openly considered is Wan v Kwan Kin Travel Services.91  The plaintiff was 
drowned owing to the negligence of a transportation company in China during a holiday 
booked with the first defendant, a Hong Kong based travel agent.  The issue was whether the 
travel agent “undertook no more than that [to] arrange for services to be provided by others”, 
or undertook to provide those services itself.  The distinction appears slender.  However, in the 
first case the duty can be discharged by showing that reasonable care and skill was taken in 
selecting those other persons, whereas in the second case: 
 
The fact that the supplier of services may under the contract arrange for some or all of 
them to be performed by others does not absolve the supplier from his contractual 
obligation. He may be liable if the service is performed without the exercise of due 
care and skill on the part of the subcontractor…  The obligation undertaken is thus, if 
the person undertaking to supply the services performs them himself, that he will do so 
with reasonable skill and care, and that if, where the contract permits him to do so, he 
arranges for others to supply the services, that they will be supplied with reasonable 
skill and care.92 
 
The Privy Council held that the travel agent through its contract “undertook to provide and not 
merely to arrange all the services” and was therefore liable for the negligence of its Chinese 
subcontractor.  Their Lordships disagreed with the Hong Kong Court of Appeal’s view that it 
was “an intolerable burden … to be held liable for the negligence of a transport operator in 
another country”.93  Lord Slynn observed that the travel agent could protect itself by bargaining 
for contractual protection from those who were to perform the services (the “chain of 
contracts” reasoning described above), or by including a suitable exemption clause in contracts 
with its customers.94 
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 To sum up, it is standard practice to construe contractual duties “of care” as an 
obligation to ensure that care is taken when the relevant service is rendered.  (Of course when 
the obligation is personal to the promisee—e.g. a celebrated singer engaged to sing at a 
concert—it amounts to a personal duty of care, but such situations are uncommon in 
commercial law for the reasons given by Lord Diplock.95)  The Supreme Court in Woodland was 
therefore right to assume that a client suing a private school or hospital in contract would 
succeed where harm was caused by a negligent contractor (e.g. agency nurse or supply 
teacher).96  There is strong reason to believe that the strictness of this approach meets 
commercial expectations. Moreover, strict liability for subcontractors accords with the default 
strictness of liability across the law of contract.  There is no need to talk about a special 
category of “non-delegable duty” (nor indeed, as Weir observes, “vicarious liability”) in a 
general system of strict liability. The promisor is put in breach of his own (absolute) duty to 
render the promised services by the actual performer’s failure.  Contractual obligation is 
concerned with what has to be done—how it is done (and by whom it is done) is usually 
immaterial.   
It might be thought immoral to hold people liable for failing to achieve that which they 
could not reasonably do—such as ensuring that a remote independent company take care of 
your customers, in Wan.  Moral concerns have apparently encouraged retention of a fault 
standard in German contract law.97  If so, the common law is amoral with insouciance.  A 
contractual promise is treated as a guarantee of performance or, at least, its monetary 
equivalent.  The doctrine of frustration is accordingly narrow.  The fact that it is impossible to 
deliver goods for reasons entirely beyond the seller’s control does not excuse him.98  No more 
does the impossibility of control by the travel agent in Wan. Contract lawyers devote very little 
attention to the questions of fault “with which tort lawyers are so familiar”.99  The two systems 
have entirely different assumptions about moral responsibility and fault. 
 
V. “VOLUNTARY ASSUMPTION OF RESPONSIBILITY” IN TORT 
 
The previous section shows that duties to ensure that care is taken are standard in the law of 
contract, consistent with strict contractual liability and satisfying commercial expectations.  By 
contrast fault plays a dominant role in tort.  Even fully accepting that significant pockets of 
strict liability remain and “the common law’s approach to fault is explicably more diverse than 
is sometimes realised”,100 fault is frequently necessary.  By definition liability in the tort of 
negligence requires it.  One can lament the “one-size-fits-all approach to fault”,101 and decry 
negligence’s “staggering march”,102 but a “non-delegable duty of care” remains a contradiction in 
terms.  It is not a duty to be careful at all, but one to ensure a particular result (i.e. that the 
activity in question is carefully carried out).  If tort liability generally requires fault then a good 
reason is needed to depart from that standard by imposing a strict duty to ensure that care is 
taken.   
                                                        
95 Cf. British Waggon v Lea n.000 above (distinguishing Robson v Drummond (1831) 2 B. & Ad. 303). 
96 Cf. I. Kennedy and A. Grubb, Medical Law: Text with Materials, 2nd ed. (London 1994) 414-415. 
97 S. Grundmann, “The fault principle as a chameleon of contract law: A market function approach” in 
Ben-Shahar and Porat n.000 above. 
98 E.g. Blackburn Bobbin Co. v T.W. Allen & Sons [1918] 2 K.B. 467; The Mary Nour [2008] EWCA Civ 856; 
[2008] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 526. 
99 Treitel, n.000 above, p.185. 
100 Stevens, n.000 above, p.368. 
101 Ibid 
102 J.A. Weir, “The staggering march of negligence” in P.F. Cane and J. Stapleton (eds.), The Law of 
Obligations: Essays in Celebration of John Fleming (Oxford 1998). 
Even Robert Stevens, who identifies the “swollen ‘tort’ of negligence” (rather than the 
“non-delegable duty”) as “the cuckoo in the nest” of tort law,103 accepts that strict liability’s 
limits necessitate limits on “non-delegable duties”.  It has been impossible to identify a general 
principle of strict liability for dangerous things since Read v J Lyons & Co.104  It accordingly 
became anomalous to preserve “non-delegable duties” for so-called ultra-hazardous activities.105  
Stevens admits the inconsistency. “It seems insupportable that a [careful] defendant will be held 
liable for the extra-hazardous activity of an independent contractor, when it would not be so 
liable if it carefully carried out the same activity itself.”106  But does this reasoning not apply to 
any area in which liability is usually based on fault (which is much of the law of torts)?  Stevens 
rightly draws attention to strict liability under various statutes.107  But these are no more than 
further isolated instances of the “exceptional and heterogeneous” situations in which “a person 
may be liable although his own organisation has operated flawlessly”.108  Parliament might 
theoretically lay down general strict liabilities (e.g. for hazardous activities).  But in this area as 
so often the legislature has seemed “afraid to rise to the dignity of a general proposition”.109  
The extant strict(er) statutory duties are piecemeal.  No general strict duty (even less “non-
delegable duty”) can be synthesised from them.  By contrast with the position in contract law, 
there is no general principle of strict liability, nor therefore strict liability for independent 
contractors, in tort. 
It follows that there can be no general parallel between the undoubted contractual 
liability for an independent contractor’s default and liability in tort.  However in Woodland, 
Lord Sumption’s analogy was drawn not in the archetypical tort situation between complete 
strangers but given a pre-existing relationship between the parties.  Moreover, his Lordship 
considered cases where the defendant “assumes responsibility” to the claimant for the 
carefulness of his contractors.  The analogy between contract and tort here seems strong.110  
Commentators have argued persuasively that “assumption of responsibility” is the central 
principled determinant of the “non-delegable duty”.111  The Supreme Court has now endorsed 
this explanation.  It seems reassuring to have a unified theory in place of the ad hoc precedents 
that so “perplexed” Glanville Williams and had become little clearer half a century later.112   But 
on closer examination the explanation is much less convincing.  Usually, liability has not been 
“assumed” but imposed by the courts.  In its original nursery of pure economic loss that criticism 
has been widely accepted, so the elevation of “assumption of responsibility” into the touchstone 
for “non-delegable duties” is puzzling.  For if liability depends more on judicial imposition than 
party intention, the analysis is simply pushed back one stage: when should such duties be 
imposed?  Bluntly, “assumption of responsibility” provides no test at all, and no answers—it 
simply poses the same questions in a disguised form. 
“Assumption of responsibility” has enjoyed mercurial favour from those set on 
extending tort liability in a contractual direction.  Admittedly, when taken at face value its 
central case presents a seductive argument for liability.  If a defendant expressly guarantees the 
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carefulness of his contractors (or expressly undertakes to use reasonable care to protect the 
claimant’s financial or other interests), there is a case for holding the defendant liable for not 
doing so even in the absence of payment (i.e. of contract).113 If the defendant’s undertaking 
truly gives rise to a “relationship equivalent to contract” (without actually constituting one),114 
that seems a good reason to allow recovery in negligence for kinds of loss, or in kinds of 
situations, that contract recognises (but tort normally does not).115  Such an undertaking may 
generate a positive duty to improve the claimant’s position (whereas ordinarily “pure 
omissions” do not lead to liability in tort).  An express undertaking to prevent self-harm 
generated an extraordinary duty of care of this kind in Calvert v William Hill.116  As Stevens says, 
where a duty is voluntarily assumed “the law is, inevitably, less concerned with preserving [the 
defendant’s] interest in liberty of action”.117  Such an assumption may override other rules that 
would ordinarily preclude liability, including the policy of protecting public authorities from 
claims that might engender a “defensive” approach.118  
The great difficulty is how rarely the persuasive central case arises in practice.119  Not 
surprisingly, for how many people would willingly and expressly undertake wider legal 
liabilities without payment for doing so, or without compulsion?120  The conjecture is born out 
by the case-law on pure economic loss.  In very few cases involving liability for “assuming 
responsibility” did the defendant expressly undertake a legally enforceable obligation (one 
sounding liability in the event of careless performance).  In the cognate area of promissory 
estoppel, some exhibit a sceptical attitude to such “undertakings”—Longmore L.J. has 
demanded clear evidence of an alleged promise to forgo rights without any obvious reciprocal 
benefit.121   
By contrast, in cases where “assumption of responsibility” has been invoked to hold 
defendants liable for (e.g.) pure economic loss in tort, judges have seemed enthusiastic to 
saddle defendants with exceptional tort liability when they could have—but did not—
contractually promise to protect the relevant interests.122  Increasingly it has been accepted that 
“notional” or “objective” “assumption of responsibility” reflects judicial imposition rather than 
the intentions of the actual defendant.123  In which case it depends on questions of “fairness and 
policy” and is not “a simple question of fact”.124  Thus “assumption of responsibility” usually 
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operates as a mere cipher.  It is expressive of the conclusion reached, not an independent 
reason for it. 
 Lord Sumption referred in passing to “assumption of responsibility’s” usual relevance as 
a “tool” for controlling economic loss liability.125  But no mention was made of the many 
difficulties with it, and criticisms of it, in that context. This is unfortunate.  Even one of the 
theory’s prominent supporters, John Murphy, accepts that the language is:  
 
apt to mislead … insofar as it suggests an element of voluntariness on the part of the 
defendant which is clearly absent in most non-delegable duty cases ...  The truth is that 
‘assumed responsibilities’ in non-delegable duty cases are more commonly imputed by 
the courts than voluntarily undertaken by defendants.126   
 
The oxymoronic enterprise of “calling an imposition an assumption” has been heavily criticised 
elsewhere.127  The real question is when such liability should be imposed.  Search for a fictitious 
promise to undertake additional liability is very unlikely to provide the answer. 
 The landmark decisions expanding hospitals’ direct liability over the last century 
generally identified relevant “undertakings” by the hospital.  But no promissory conduct or 
statements by doctors or hospital managers have been identified.  In Hillyer v St Bartholomew’s 
Hospital (1909) “The only duty undertaken by the defendants is to use due care and skill in 
selecting their medical staff”.128  Disapproving this in Gold v Essex County Council Lord Greene 
M.R. considered the obligations assumed by the hospital (whether contractual or otherwise).129  
In Cassidy v Ministry of Health Denning L.J. founded his decision (a cornerstone of hospitals’ 
“non-delegable duty”) on the “acceptance” of a patient for treatment.  By accepting him the 
hospital had undertaken to use reasonable care and skill.130  It is now well established that such 
acceptance generates a positive duty to treat (so that hospitals do not benefit from the 
“omissions principle”).131  Why this does not apply to (other) emergency services when they 
answer a 999 call is not wholly clear.132   
But whether an NHS hospital could lawfully refuse to treat a patient is doubtful—in 
which case the voluntariness of their acceptance seems fictitious.133  Perhaps health authorities 
choose to open a hospital in a particular place, and individual doctors choose to practise 
medicine (or work at a given hospital or in a certain medical field).  By this time however, the 
notion of “voluntary assumption” has become greatly attenuated, compatibly with Atiyah’s very 
wide, and weak, version.  Having considered implied terms in contracts of sale, Atiyah argued 
that the (clearly tortious) obligations on drivers were no less “voluntary”.  A driver “is 
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voluntarily on the road, voluntarily driving his car, and may be said to submit himself to the 
requirements of the law with as much or as little truth as the seller of goods”.134  Few would 
attempt to base road users’ obligations to take care on assumption of responsibility.  Such duties 
are acknowledged to be imposed by law.  That is equally true of medical negligence.   
Its expansion over the century since Hillyer’s case has nothing to do with hospital 
authorities’ moves to assume more extensive legally-enforceable duties.  Rather, as one of the 
leading Canadian cases recognises, the tortious “relationship between hospitals and the public in 
contemporary society” has altered to reflect “profound changes in social structures and public 
attitudes relating to medical services and the concomitant changes in the function of hospitals in 
providing them”.135 Kirby P. advocated the expansion of “non-delegable duties” to 
accommodate “the intensely technological nature of modern hospitals”—especially the use of 
“visiting experts” (who are not hospital employees) to operate equipment.136  The emphasis 
throughout has been on adapting liability to meet public expectations.  It has surely been 
imposed by law, not voluntarily assumed by hospitals.   
 Woodland is another dubious example of “voluntarily assumed” responsibility.137  
Previously, in Customs v Barclays Bank, a claim failed because the defendant bank’s compulsion 
(by court order) to freeze its customer’s account was inimical to the argument that it had 
voluntarily assumed responsibility to the claimant beneficiary of the freezing order (i.e. its 
customer’s creditor).138  That a public authority was under a statutory duty to perform a task 
has been seen as precluding a “voluntary assumption of responsibility” for its performance.139  
Essex County Council was under similar legal compulsion.  The statutory National Curriculum 
for England requires that: “All schools must provide swimming instruction either in Key Stage 1 
or Key Stage 2”.  State schools like Whitmore Junior School therefore have no choice but to 
provide swimming lessons.  This aspect of Woodland fits uneasily with the whole notion of a 
“voluntary” assumption of responsibility.  Essex runs schools because it has a public duty to do 
so, it had no choice whether to school Miss Woodland, and no choice under the National 
Curriculum whether to teach her to swim.  (Equally, Basildon Council had no choice but to 
consider private operators for its leisure services; local authorities can operate facilities 
themselves only if this represents “best value”.140) 
 Tomlinson L.J. feared that recognising liability in Woodland might “chill” schools against 
providing wider educational experiences—since they have no control over outside premises 
and staff but would be accountable for their negligence.141  Lord Sumption stated that schools 
need not answer for “those to whom no control over the child has been delegated, such as bus 
drivers or the theatres, zoos or museums to which children may be taken by school staff in 
school hours”.142 This might help assuage concerns that potential legal liability deters the 
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provision of adventurous youth activities.143  But we may safely predict that Lord Sumption’s 
obiter comments will be tested in future litigation.144  Ironically, there would be a much 
stronger argument that a school had voluntarily assumed responsibility for pupils’ safety on a 
theatre visit (where Lord Sumption was at pains to rule out liability) which was organised on 
the school’s initiative rather than obligatory under the National Curriculum.  It is a relief that 
swimming lessons (at least) cannot be withdrawn because of schools’ fears about liability after 
Woodland.  But the statutory duty precluding that undesirable outcome makes “voluntary 
assumption of responsibility” untenable.   
 It may be socially desirable to hold state schools strictly liable for the negligence of 
anybody carrying out educational functions on their behalf.  But inventing “assumptions of 
responsibility”, or drawing parallels with contract that are unsustainable for fault-based tort 
liability, are not convincing ways to justify it. 
 
VI. TORT AND THE BASELINE OF SAFETY:  
VICARIOUS LIABILITY FOR INDEPENDENT CONTRACTORS? 
 
Tort law is not a fault-based monoculture (albeit fault is generally seen as a good prima facie 
reason for liability).  There are islands of strict liability (albeit seen as exceptional and requiring 
justification).  Indeed, the continent of negligence harbours within it a vast empire of strict 
liability for the torts of others (vicarious liability).  The true justification for vicarious liability is 
perennially controversial.  But its practical importance cannot be in doubt.  While tort remains 
theoretically based on individual responsibility, in practice a large proportion of tort liability is 
imposed on organisations (business corporations, public authorities) answering impersonally for 
their employees’ torts.  Despite its blatant inconsistency with notions of personal responsibility, 
vicarious liability attracts surprisingly few critics.  Its “social convenience and rough justice” 
evidently exerts a wide appeal.145  In part because vicarious liability mostly avoids holding 
organisations “personally” liable for their “own” torts.  Although such direct liability might 
sound desirable in principle it would necessitate rules to attribute the acts of natural persons to 
corporate abstractions, to decide whether an organisation was at fault “itself”.  Of course such 
theories are not beyond the wit of man, but historically they have been obscured by 
“anthropomorphic inquir[es]” and their “metaphysical shadows”;146 and even the modern 
“contextual” approach is scarcely free of difficulty.147  Vicarious liability performs an attribution 
function in a broad and simple way.148  The employer answers for all torts committed by 
employees in the course of employment.  The possibility of direct liability of the organisation 
“itself” remains, but as noted above the very width of vicarious liability (the other route round 
the triangle) precludes that inquiry in most cases. 
 Business organisation today has placed this model under pressure.  Vicarious liability is 
said, axiomatically, to apply to employees (only) and not to independent contractors.  Once, 
such situations were less common and those that arose threatened to expand strict liability for 
individuals (the householder-client of a negligent plumber, etc).149  But when businesses 
frequently do, and public authorities typically must, outsource their operations to independent 
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contractors, a troubling gap opens up.  The Supreme Court in Woodland evidently thought it 
unacceptable that authorities would escape liability after outsourcing services to negligent 
contractors (absenting negligence in the outsourcing process).  It has been suggested above that 
equal unease would arise irrespective of parallel contractual liability (no similar services 
provided for payment); the contract issue is ultimately a red herring.  It is time to face openly 
whether vicarious liability, which has recently experienced more than one “William Ellis 
moment” by expanding beyond strict employer-employee relationships,150 could also extend to 
independent contractors. 
Woodland, of course, provides the seed from which the revolution might grow.  We 
have argued above that much of the Supreme Court’s reasoning simply cannot be accepted.  
The analogy with contract is unconvincing and ultimately irrelevant; “voluntary assumption of 
responsibility” a transparent fiction.  Yet the presence of unconvincing arguments does not 
necessarily mean the decision is wrong.  As a matter of precedent it is here to stay, in any 
event.  How broad are the implications?  Woodland could inaugurate a specific rule of vicarious 
liability for contractors for the benefit of vulnerable groups (school pupils, hospital patients, 
etc).  Protecting such persons has an especially appealing resonance as a general matter,151 and 
patients’ “special need of care” was cited by Mason J as a reason for imposing exceptional “non-
delegable duties” in his influential judgment in Kondis v State Transport Authority.152  Potentially 
though, this is a far-reaching basis for a supposedly exceptional rule.  Is not every stranger (i.e. 
everyone who lacks “alternative means of protection”)153 vulnerable to the financial 
consequences of a negligent contractor’s impecuniosity?154  Even confining “vulnerability” to 
physical risks, this justifies the much-derided category of “ultra-hazardous activities” as readily as 
special weakness of claimants.155  For as Murphy says, vulnerability “comprises no more than 
the inverse of abnormal risk”.156  Also, as discussed, Lord Sumption sought to preclude future 
extensions of liability to extramural activities beyond the direct physical control of school 
authorities.157  Yet there is no serious suggestion that schoolchildren become any less vulnerable 
in such situations—indeed with much “adventure activity” the opposite must be true. 
Another possibility, canvassed already,158 is that Woodland is better seen as a special 
principle applicable to public authorities: these should not be able to contract out of the 
liabilities they would previously have born (qua master of servant-tortfeasors) by outsourcing 
the provision of public services. This might seem politically appealing to some.  But there is no 
apparent basis for such a “preservation of liability” in the legislation enabling (and requiring) 
outsourcing of service-provision, nor (it seems) in general principles of administrative law.159  
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performance to a contractor… [It] remains legally and politically accountable for their exercise… In 
principle, authorities should remain liable for compliance with public law norms whether a service is 
contracted out or delivered in-house” A.C.L. Davies, The Public Law of Government Contracts (Oxford 
Such arguments have not found judicial favour in the past: for example in A v MoD, which raised 
the very question whether the Ministry’s (alleged) non-delegable duty to patients could be 
sloughed off by its outsourcing medical care to other providers, instead of running its own 
military hospitals (it could).160  Similarly, Wright J. found nothing in the relevant legislation to 
displace the ordinary rule precluding liability for the torts of an independent contractor, when 
the Secretary of State had delegated functions to a privately-run immigration detention 
centre.161 
In any event, outsourcing is hardly a phenomenon confined to public services.  It 
originated in the private sector and was imported to the public realm in the hope of improving 
efficiency.  The “problem” of an organisation outsourcing functions to independent companies 
instead of providing them in-house is just as likely to confront accident victims in the private 
context.  Again therefore, the general question of vicarious liability for contractors is raised. 
 Space precludes an answer here.  But the costs and benefits can be sketched.  At a very 
simple level, victims would benefit from having a second, potentially solvent target (the client 
of the contractor-tortfeasor); whereas those clients would, obviously, lose out.  But it is not 
simply a transfer between the groups (a zero-sum game).  There is reason to think that 
extending vicarious liability to contractors would result in the widespread inefficiency of double 
insurance (two parties insuring against the same risk—a cost which benefits only the insurance 
industry).  At present, one benefit of outsourcing a function is precisely that the risk of liability 
(for injuries created by the activity) is outsourced too.  As Merkin and Steele report, it is 
normal for outsourcing contracts to oblige the contractor to carry public liability insurance 
against such risks—a clear recognition that the risk has been transferred.162  Of course the 
“outsourcer” does not need to insure against those same liabilities (given the classical common 
law rule).  Should Woodland herald a general collapse of that rule however, it is plain that 
“outsourcers” would need to insure against those risks too.  Hence the inefficiency.163  (In 
passing we can note that the same “double insurance” cost is not imposed in practice by 
(ordinary) vicarious liability for employees: simply, the employee is typically not insured, and 
does not need to be insured, because actions for damages against employees personally (rather 
than the vicariously liable employer) are extremely rare—and those that are brought have been 
controversial enough to lead to calls for legislative reversal,164 or spurred judges to extreme 
doctrinal innovation to protect the employee.165  In short, the position (de facto if not de jure)166 
is that vicarious liability excludes the personal liability of employees.167  But nobody suggests that 
contractors should not remain liable in a Woodland situation—hence the double insurance 
problem.) 
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 It might seem Scrooge personified to suggest that Miss Woodland’s damages claim 
against the authorities should have been struck out—even pointing out that her rights of action 
against the lifeguard, the lifeguard’s employer (the contractor), and their common insurer, 
remained unimpaired.  But tort lawyers must beware another unsavoury literary archetype.168  
Lady Bountiful is typically thought patronising, but when the riches bestowed belong not to the 
judges but the litigating parties, they commit the further sin of deriving pleasure “from the 
consciousness of spending others’ money better than they would themselves”.169 At the very 
least, any reform in the law must consider who pays the price.  Generalising vicarious liability 
for contractors would of course impose costs on their clients (“employers”) but also, less 
obviously, on society as a whole through the waste of double insurance.  Given the prevalence 
of outsourcing, this would act as a drag not only private enterprise, but also increase the price 
of delivering public services (in crude terms, more of the finite revenue from taxation will be 
spent on insurance premiums,170 and so less on teachers, as a result of Woodland). 
 
VII. CONCLUSION 
 
It may be helpful to summarise the argument. 
 
1. The law can, and does, recognise duties to ensure that care is taken by whoever is carrying on a 
particular activity (as opposed to a personal duty to take care oneself).  As a duty to ensure a 
certain outcome this is a (specific) form of strict liability.  
 
2. Such duties are normal in contract.  This reflects the general expectation that even promises 
to provide a measured service (e.g. “good and workmanlike” carpentry) guarantee that services 
of that quality will be provided.  Promisors do not usually undertake to provide the service 
themselves: it is widely appreciated in many (if not most) contracts that they cannot.  A fortiori 
they do not merely promise to take care personally to provide services of the stipulated standard 
(e.g. by carefully selecting those who are actually to do the work).  A promisee is usually 
indifferent about who performs; what matters is what is performed (i.e. services of the 
stipulated standard).  These points are rarely explicitly discussed, but are widely assumed for 
the allocation of liability in multi-party arrangements.  The presumption fits the near-absolute 
liability for breach across the law of contract. 
 
3. Duties to ensure that care is taken have exceptionally been recognised in tort under the 
misleading label “non-delegable duty” (which should ideally be discarded).  But such duties are 
as anomalous within fault-grounded liability such as negligence as they are redundant in torts of 
strict liability.171  Even accepting that negligence is not the only tort and that strict liability 
retains a sporadically important role,172 a convincing reason is necessary to justify a strict duty 
to ensure that care is taken when, ordinarily, a defendant would not be liable in the absence of 
fault.  Delegating performance to an apparently competent, carefully selected contractor 
ordinarily discharges a duty of care by performing it. 
 
4. It has been proposed that a voluntary assumption of responsibility (i.e. to ensure that care is 
taken) justifies such a duty.  The theory has received wide support and attractively identifies a 
species of tort liability analogous to contract. However, if taken seriously, “assumption of 
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responsibility” would justify liability in very few situations (i.e. only when, without payment, a 
defendant willingly assumed such a strict, legally enforceable obligation).  In practice, the 
concept has been discredited by frequent invocation in cases where there was neither express 
nor implied assumption,173 and/or nothing voluntary about it (including Woodland). 
 
5. The Supreme Court in Woodland strove to avoid leaving a state school pupil, suing in tort, in 
a worse position when injured by an independent contractor than a private school pupil would 
be, suing in contract.  But such distinctions are inevitable.  Contract and tort doctrines differ 
fundamentally (e.g. on accrual of the cause of action), leading to different outcomes (e.g. on 
“preventive” and “loss of chance” damages).  The subject matter of this article is another 
prominent example.  Even more obviously (indeed tautologously), promisees will be in a better 
position when they negotiate and pay for a higher degree of protection through their contracts.  
Fine distinctions arise when identical services are provided both gratuitously (e.g. by public 
authorities) and for reward (under contract).  Drawing such distinctions may seem invidious, 
but from a purely doctrinal perspective that is not a satisfactory reason for ignoring them. 
 
6. In sum, it has been shown why duties to ensure care is taken fit easily into contract but only 
with great difficulty into tort; that the different approaches derive from fundamental features of 
contractual and tortious liability, especially the role of fault (and not merely “technical 
differences”);174 that the distinction cannot be ignored solely because it produces different (less 
generous) outcomes in tort cases compared with factually similar contract claims; that 
“assumption of responsibility” holds out some promise for principled bridging of the divide, but 
it has been more often abused than convincingly applied.  
 
As the work of Atiyah and others has demonstrated, the position of the contract-tort borderline 
changes over time and stirs deep economic and political controversies. While coherence with 
the overall doctrinal structure of contract and tort is (it has been argued here) important, it 
cannot ultimately determine the economic/political questions that lie beneath the surface.  The 
most influential contemporary counterblast to the expansion of tort has little traction upon the 
instant question.  Giving commercial parties for free (i.e. through tort) obligations that they 
could have paid for by contracting has been heavily (and rightly) criticised.175  But the corollary 
is that absence of contract should not exclude tort liability when the claimant was “vulnerable” 
(i.e. not well placed to protect herself through a contract).176  If the contractual analogy in 
Woodland is in the end misleading, the absence of a contract still does not preclude wider liability 
in tort outside the commercial sphere. 
Woodland, if correctly decided, should therefore be seen as establishing a level of 
protection that everyone is entitled to expect, irrespective of payment.177  Namely that 
organisations should be vicariously liable for the negligence of their contractors.  This is the 
logical outcome of “contract envy” of the superior protection of injured private pupils or 
patients.  The intuitive discontent, properly understood, relates to tort’s inadequacy in an 
absolute sense, not just in comparison with potential rights under contracts.  (Such a 
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comparison proves too much since contracting consumers might always be better protected; 
yet courts have frequently affirmed limits on tort liability notwithstanding contract 
beneficiaries’ greater rights.)  Absenting a true voluntary assumption of responsibility, tort 
liability is imposed by law.  Whether we discuss duties to ensure care is taken, “non-delegable 
duties”, or vicarious liability (for contractors) ultimately matters little.  But the third option 
would avoid the anomalies of the former, discussed above.  It would focus attention on what 
seems to be the real question latent in this area: should organisations now answer for their 
contractors as well as their employees, when outsourcing is becoming ubiquitous?  Considering 
the justifications for vicarious liability, and for traditionally limiting it to employees, will be 
necessary to answer this question.  By contrast, the absolute liability of a promisor when a 
service fails to meet the contractually-defined standard provides little illumination for a law of 
torts which retains fault as its default standard of personal responsibility. 
 
